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In his dissenting opinion in Atkins v. Virginia,1 Justice Scalia said:
“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of
America that we are expounding. . . .  [W]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however en-
lightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be im-
posed upon Americans through the Constitution.”2 I will refer to Justice
Scalia’s view as the sovereigntist model of constitutional law. According to
the sovereigntist model, the constitution of any particular country is an ex-
pression of that country’s national identity. Constitutions are created
through acts of popular sovereignty, in which “we the people” of a particu-
lar nation join together to adopt a document that embodies the nation’s sov-
ereignty. Under this view, France’s Constitution is an expression of French
national identity, Chile’s constitution is an expression of Chilean national
identity, and so on.
In this brief essay, I hope to persuade readers that the sovereigntist
model of constitutional law is descriptively inaccurate. In fact, the national
constitutions of most countries in the world bear striking similarities to each
other.3 As explained in Part I, the main reason why we observe similarities
among national constitutions throughout the world is that those constitu-
tions are products of transnational forces that shape the processes of writing
and interpreting constitutions. When a nation adopts a new constitution, the
drafting process does not occur in an isolation tank. The drafters borrow
liberally from existing templates by copying and pasting text from other
national constitutions and from international human rights instruments.4
Similarly, constitutional interpretation does not occur in isolation. When
* John A. and Elizabeth H. Sutro Professor of Law, Santa Clara University.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69
n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
3. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional
Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61, 61–62 (2013).
4. See infra Part I.
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judges interpret constitutional provisions that protect individual rights, they
frequently consult judicial decisions from other countries that have similar
rights provisions in their constitutions. Sovereigntists may object to the
practice of judicial borrowing. However, they cannot block the dissemina-
tion of ideas across national borders any more than they can block the trans-
mission of a virus across national borders. Any attempt to do so is doomed
to fail.
The remainder of this essay is divided into two parts. Part I discusses
the transnational forces that affect constitution drafting. Part II analyzes the
transnational forces that affect constitutional interpretation. Part II contends
that US constitutional culture developed a “human rights taboo” in the early
1950s. As a result, US courts rarely cite international human rights law.
However, despite the taboo, international human rights norms exerted tre-
mendous, but largely unacknowledged, influence over the development of
constitutional law in the United States between 1948 and 1976.
I. CONSTITUTION-MAKING AS A TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISE
In a recent book, Constitution-Making and Transnational Legal Order,
Professors Shaffer, Ginsburg, and Halliday debunk what they call the “na-
tionalist myth” of constitution-making.5 The nationalist myth envisions
“constitution-making as the work of a small group of national authors de-
bating first principles.”6 The coauthors contend that “this common way of
conceiving of constitution-making . . . is simply wrong. . . . When one
examines the actual processes by which constitutional documents are made,
one sees an array of transnational influences, actors, and ideas that provide
the very grammar for the project.”7
Modern constitution making is heavily influenced by a group of insti-
tutions that, in the words of Harold Koh, act as transnational norm entrepre-
neurs.8 Leading institutional players involved in advising states with respect
to constitution making include:
• intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations,
the International Development Law Organization,9 and the In-
ternational Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance;10
5. Tom Ginsburg, Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Introduction to CONSTITUTION-
MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 1, 3–6 (Tom Ginsburg, Terence C. Halliday &
Gregory Shaffer eds., 2019).
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 1.
8. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 647 (1998).
9. See About IDLO, INT’L DEV. L. ORG., https://www.idlo.int/about-idlo/about-idlo (last
visited Feb. 19, 2021).
10. See International IDEA About Us, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSIS-
TANCE, https://www.idea.int/about-us (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
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• organizations affiliated with particular national governments,
such as the US Institute of Peace (funded by the US govern-
ment)11 and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public
Law and International Law (funded primarily by the German
government);12
• organizations affiliated with national political parties, includ-
ing the National Democratic Institute13 and the International
Republican Institute;14
• the Venice Commission, which is an organ of the Council of
Europe;15 and
• independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as
the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG), based
in Washington, DC.16
In the modern era, when a country decides to adopt a new national
constitution, it is likely to be bombarded with outside advice from several
of these transnational norm entrepreneurs. For example, when the newly
independent state of South Sudan first adopted an interim constitution, and
then a transitional constitution, it received outside assistance from “the Na-
tional Democratic Institute, . . . the Max Planck Institute for Comparative
Public Law and International Law,” the US Institute of Peace, the Interna-
tional Development Law Organization, and the PILPG.17 Outside advisors
have played a role in constitution drafting at least since the late eighteenth
century, when Jean-Jacques Rousseau was called upon to advise the gov-
ernments of Corsica and Poland.18 However, according to Professor Gins-
burg, “the pace and intensity of transnational involvement in constitution-
making has intensified since 1990.”19
11. See Democracy and Governance, U.S. INST. PEACE, https://www.usip.org/issue-areas/de-
mocracy-governance (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
12. See Background and Current Profile, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMPAR. PUB. L. & INT’L
L., https://www.mpil.de/en/pub/institute/the-institute/background.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
13. See What We Do, NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., https://www.ndi.org/what-we-
do?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIvIj5-ZLN6gIVVx6tBh0SbQGeEAAYASACEgIS7vD_BwE (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2021).
14. See What We Do, INT’L REPUBLICAN INST., https://www.iri.org/what-we-do (last visited
Feb. 19, 2021).
15. See Paul Craig, Transnational Constitution-Making: The Contribution of the Venice
Commission on Law and Democracy, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL OR-
DER, supra note 5, at 156.
16. See A Global Pro Bono Law Firm, PUB. INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., https://www.publicinter
nationallawandpolicygroup.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
17. Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Advice and Transnational Legal Order, in CONSTITUTION-
MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 26, 41.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 40.
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In 2009, the UN Secretary General issued guidance on UN assistance
to constitution-making processes.20 That document manifests the inherent
tension involved in the role of outside advisors. On one hand, the guidance
directs UN personnel to “promote compliance of constitutions with interna-
tional human rights and other norms and standards . . . [including] the rights
that have been established under international law for groups that may be
subjected to marginalization and discrimination . . . , including women,
children, minorities, indigenous peoples, [and others].”21 On the other hand,
the guidance states explicitly that constitution making is “a sovereign na-
tional process, which, to be legitimate and successful, must be nationally
owned and led.”22 Of course, political leaders in many countries may resist
the idea of codifying equal rights for women and minorities in their national
constitutions. Thus, as Professor Ginsburg notes, “There is an irony that an
international organization which is itself involved in imposing certain ideas
is also the body that urges local participation in the process, and safeguards
participation as a key process value.”23
Notwithstanding any normative commitment to local control,24 quanti-
tative empirical analysis of constitutional texts demonstrates that national
constitutions are the product of transnational forces. Professor David Law
analyzed “a corpus of 615 constitutional texts, drawn from a variety of
sources and encompassing roughly two-thirds of all new or interim consti-
tutions ever produced.”25 His analysis utilizes a type of automated content
analysis known as topic modeling, which “breaks down a text corpus into
its component topics by identifying patterns of word frequency and word
co-occurrence.”26 In the context of topic modeling, the word topic “is a
term of art that refers simply to a set of words that have a particular
probability of appearing in conjunction with each other.”27 Professor Law’s
central conclusion is striking: “constitution-writing is more a barometer of
geopolitical hegemony and . . . influence than a technical, apolitical exer-
cise in institutional design.”28 His analysis suggests that most constitutions
in the world fit into one of four categories: Commonwealth constitutions
20. See U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary General: United Nations
Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes 1 (Apr. 2009), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/
Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitution-making_Processes_FINAL.pdf.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 43.
24. See Abrak Saati, Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm:
Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in Others?, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 283 (discussing local participation and local
control).
25. David S. Law, Constitutional Dialects: The Language of Transnational Legal Orders, in
CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 110, 116.
26. Id. at 114.
27. Id. at 122.
28. Id. at 123.
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that arise from British colonialism; Latin American constitutions that derive
from Spanish colonialism; Francophonie constitutions that arise from
French colonialism; and socialist constitutions that are the byproduct of the
diffusion of socialist ideology.29 Law concludes that the use of topic model-
ing to analyze constitutional texts “captures the rise and fall of empires” by
exposing “the linguistic markers of competing transnational legal orders.”30
A different type of quantitative analysis demonstrates that, over time,
international human rights norms have become more entrenched in the texts
of national constitutions. Professor Colin Beck and his coauthors completed
a detailed empirical study that presents a quantitative measurement of the
incorporation of international human rights norms into national constitu-
tions.31 They identified a list of 65 specific rights that are included in both
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Comparative
Constitutions Project database.32 As of 1925, the average constitution pro-
tected only about 15 of those 65 rights. By 1950, the average constitution
protected about 22 of those 65 rights. By 2013—the last year for which data
were available—the average constitution protected 35 of those 65 rights.33
The authors of the study conclude: “[I]t is clear that the number of UDHR
provisions present in a constitution tracks time rather closely. More recent
constitutions tend to have higher scores on the human rights index.”34 They
performed regression analyses to control for numerous variables in an effort
to explain why the number of UDHR rights protected by national constitu-
tions increases over time. They conclude: “[M]ultivariate analyses confirm
that constitutional law and language is affected by the transnational context
at the time of its adoption. . . . In short, constitutions should be considered
global-transnational documents as much as national ones.”35
In sum, rigorous empirical analysis of constitutional texts demonstrates
that transnational forces have a significant impact on the texts of national
constitutions. Therefore, the sovereigntist model of constitution making,
which conceives of each nation’s constitution as an expression of its unique
national identity, is descriptively inaccurate.
29. See id. at 128–40.
30. Id. at 149.
31. Colin J. Beck et al., Constitutions in World Society: A New Measure of Human Rights, in
CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 85.
32. See id. at 90–95. The Comparative Constitutions Project is an important scholarly effort
to produce “comprehensive data about the world’s constitutions . . . in order to answer a set of
research questions about the origins and consequences of constitutional choices.” About the CCP,
COMPAR. CONSTS. PROJECT, https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/about-ccp (last visited
Feb. 19, 2021).
33. Beck et al., supra note 31, at 95 fig.4.1, 97 tbl.4.2.
34. Id. at 99.
35. Id. at 104.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND JUDICIAL BORROWING
In a series of cases at the beginning of this century—notably Atkins v.
Virginia,36 Lawrence v. Texas,37 and Roper v. Simmons38—the Supreme
Court cited international and foreign sources to support majority decisions
based on the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments.39 Citations to interna-
tional and foreign sources provoked sharp dissents from Justice Scalia, who
condemned the citation to international and foreign sources as illegiti-
mate.40 Those decisions also prompted a vigorous scholarly debate about
the merits of so-called transnational judicial dialogue, or what I will call
simply “judicial borrowing.”41
Rather than revisiting those debates, this part explores the reasons why
some judges engage in judicial borrowing, whereas others condemn the
practice. The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section ad-
dresses judicial borrowing by courts in other countries. I suggest that there
are three primary reasons for judicial borrowing. First, constitutional texts
are similar in many national constitutions, especially the provisions on indi-
vidual rights. Second, litigants ask courts to apply those texts in factual
circumstances where the text itself does not provide a definitive answer.
Third, transnational norm entrepreneurs engaged in constitutional litigation
encourage courts to consider relevant decisions by foreign and international
tribunals.
The final section discusses the opposition to judicial borrowing by US
courts. I show that the roots of that opposition can be traced to the Bricker
Amendment controversy in the early 1950s, which gave rise to a “human
rights taboo” in US constitutional culture. That taboo inhibits US courts
from citing international human rights documents. Nevertheless, between
1948 and 1976, the United States incorporated many international human
rights norms into federal law through a process of “silent incorporation.”42
36. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
38. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
39. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73, 576–77; Roper, 543
U.S. at 575–78.
40. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation in the
Twenty-First Century: Change and Continuity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 507–17 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S.
Dodge eds., 2011); Roger P. Alford, Why Constitutional Comparativism Is Different: A Response
to Professor Tushnet, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE, supra, at 518–22; Melissa A. Waters, Judicial Dialogue in Roper: Signaling the Court’s
Emergence as a Transnational Legal Actor?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra, at 523–29.
42. See David L. Sloss & Michael P. Van Alstine, International Law in Domestic Court, in
HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104–05 (Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher
Whytock eds., 2017) (discussing silent incorporation).
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By practicing silent incorporation, US courts incorporate international
norms into constitutional law without explicitly citing international sources.
A. Judicial Borrowing in Foreign Courts
Constitutional scholars in the United States distinguish between “con-
stitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction.”43 “Interpreta-
tion is the activity of identifying the semantic meaning of a particular use of
language in context. Construction is the activity of applying that meaning to
particular factual circumstances.”44 The vast majority of constitutional con-
troversies presented for decision by national courts cannot be resolved by
interpretation alone because most constitutional texts are sufficiently vague
that reasonable people can disagree about how particular textual provisions
should be applied in specific factual circumstances. Therefore, to decide
concrete cases, courts must move beyond constitutional interpretation to
constitutional construction. When they engage in constitutional construc-
tion, they sometimes consider the decisions of international and foreign
tribunals that have construed textually similar provisions in factually similar
circumstances. Indeed, judges in supreme courts and constitutional courts
throughout the world routinely engage in the practice of judicial borrowing
when they construe their national constitutions.45
The decision by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in Makoni v.
Commissioner of Prisons46 illustrates the practice of judicial borrowing and
the reasons why courts engage in the practice. Makoni was serving a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a
murder he committed in the 1990s. He argued that the LWOP sentence
violated his rights under Sections 51 and 53 of the Zimbabwe Constitu-
tion.47 Section 51 states: “Every person has inherent dignity in their private
and public life, and the right to have that dignity respected and protected.”48
Section 53 states: “No person may be subjected to physical or psychological
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”49 No
matter how carefully one analyzes the precise wording of the constitutional
text, the words themselves do not answer the question whether an LWOP
sentence is unconstitutional. Constitutional construction is necessary to an-
43. See generally Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999).
44. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66
(2011).
45. See, e.g., JUDICIAL DIALOGUE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Amrei Müller & Hege Elisabeth Kjos
eds., 2017); Johanna Kalb, The Judicial Role in New Democracies: A Strategic Account of Com-
parative Citation, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 423, 424 (2013).
46. Makoni v. Commissioner of Prisons, Const. App. No. CCZ 48/15, Judgment No. CCZ 8/
16 1 (2016) (Const. Ct. of Zim.).
47. Id. at 1–2.
48. Const. of Zimbabwe (2013) § 51.
49. Id. § 53.
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swer that question. As in most cases where courts are asked to engage in
constitutional construction, the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe had to
decide how a constitutional principle phrased in general terms should be
applied in concrete, factual circumstances.
When the Zimbabwe court considered the issue of LWOP sentences in
Makoni, the applicant’s brief contained extensive citations to international
and foreign jurisprudence.50 The applicant received assistance from “the
London-based Death Penalty Project, which has coordinated constitutional
. . . challenges in the Caribbean, East Africa, and South and Southeast
Asia,”51 and which “maintains links to the barristers at Doughty Street
Chambers and an extensive network of local partners and British NGOs.”52
Thus, like the transnational norm entrepreneurs who advise states on consti-
tution making, NGOs engaged in transnational human rights litigation en-
courage domestic courts to take account of international human rights
norms when they apply domestic constitutional law to concrete cases. In
Makoni, the efforts of transnational norm entrepreneurs paid off: the Consti-
tutional Court held that LWOP sentences are unconstitutional, and it cited
many of the foreign and international legal authorities referenced in the
applicant’s brief.53
The court’s decision in Makoni cited decisions by the Namibian Su-
preme Court54 and the South African Constitutional Court,55 as well as a
decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a case from
Mauritius.56 (The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which sits in the
United Kingdom, is the highest appellate body for certain British Common-
wealth countries, including Mauritius.) Courts in all three cases held that
LWOP sentences violated the constitutions of Namibia, South Africa, and
Mauritius, respectively. The national constitutions of Namibia, South Af-
rica, and Mauritius all include specific provisions that are textually similar
to Section 53 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution.57 Largely as a result of the trans-
50. See Andrew Novak, The Role of Legal Advocates in Transnational Judicial Dialogue:
The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty and the Evolution of International Law, 25 CAR-
DOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 179, 198 (2017) (citing Applicant’s Heads of Argument at 12, 42,
Makoni v. Commissioner of Prisons (2016) (Zim.)).
51. Id. at 199.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 198; Makoni v. Commissioner of Prisons, Const. App. No. CCZ 48/15, Judg-
ment No. CCZ 8/16 1 (2016) (Const. Ct. of Zim.).
54. Makoni, Const. App. No. CCZ 48/15, Judgment No. CCZ 8/16 at 6 (citing State v.
Tcoeib (1996) 7 BCLR 996 (NASC)).
55. State v. Bull and Another, 2002 (1) SA 535 (SCA).
56. De Boucherville v. The State of Mauritius, [2008] UKPC 37.
57. MAURITIUS [CONSTITUTION] 1968 (rev. 2016), art. 7, para. 1 (“No person shall be sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment.”); NAMIBIA
[C ONSTITUTION] 1990 (rev. 2014), art. 8, para. 2(b) (“No persons shall be subject to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); SOUTH AFRICA [CONSTITUTION] 1996
(rev. 2012), art. 12, para. 1 (“Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which
includes the right . . . not to be tortured in any way; and not to be treated or punished in a cruel,
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national forces that shape constitutional drafting (discussed in Part I of this
essay), all four constitutional provisions are similar to Article 5 of the
UDHR, which prohibits torture and “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.”58 Thus, when the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe was
presented with a question of constitutional construction involving LWOP
sentences, and the specific textual provisions at issue did not provide a de-
finitive answer to that question, the court did what many other domestic
courts have done in similar circumstances: it relied (partly) on decisions by
appellate courts in other jurisdictions that had applied textually similar pro-
visions of their own constitutions in factually similar circumstances.
In addition to citing cases from other African courts and the Privy
Council, the court in Makoni also cited two decisions from the European
Court of Human Rights that applied Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).59 Article 3 of the ECHR, like Article 5 of the
UDHR and Section 53 of the Zimbabwean Constitution, prohibits both tor-
ture and “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”60 The court also
cited a “General Comment” from the UN Human Rights Committee,61 a
committee of experts charged with overseeing implementation of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR, like
the other constitutional and international documents cited above, prohibits
torture and “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”62
In sum, contrary to the sovereigntist model, the prohibition on “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” in Section 53 is not a
unique feature of Zimbabwe’s Constitution based on a distinctive
Zimbabwean national identity. To the contrary, it is a central element of the
“global political morality of human rights”63 that is codified in numerous
national constitutions and international human rights instruments. The
choice by the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in Makoni to rely on deci-
sions by foreign and international tribunals manifests an implicit judicial
recognition that Section 53 is best understood as an expression of the global
political morality of human rights.
It is noteworthy that Section 46(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
provides that courts in Zimbabwe—when applying provisions of the Decla-
inhuman or degrading way.”). The texts of all three constitutions are taken from the Comparative
Constitutions Project database, available at https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en.
58. G.A. Res. (III) A/810, art. 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
59. Dickson v. United Kingdom (2007) ECHR (44362/04); Vinter v. United Kingdom (2013)
ECHR (66069/09, 130/10, 3896/10).
60. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
61. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 21 (Apr. 10, 1992), available at http://
hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom21.htm.
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
63. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY,
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (2017).
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ration of Rights (which includes Sections 51 and 53)—“must take into ac-
count international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe
is a party” and “may consider relevant foreign law.”64 This provision ap-
pears to be modeled on Article 39 of the South African Constitution, which
specifies that courts in South Africa “must consider international law” and
“may consider foreign law” when interpreting the Bill of Rights.65 It is not
surprising that domestic courts in countries with these types of constitu-
tional provisions are very receptive to judicial borrowing.
However, courts in other countries that lack these types of constitu-
tional provisions are also very receptive to judicial borrowing. The Supreme
Court of India is one example.66 In countries like India, where the constitu-
tional text does not specifically instruct courts to apply international or for-
eign law, courts engage in judicial borrowing for several reasons: they have
a practical need to construe indeterminate textual provisions; those provi-
sions are often similar to provisions in other national constitutional texts
and international human rights instruments (thanks to transnational influ-
ences on constitution drafting); there is an available body of jurisprudence
from international and foreign tribunals construing those textually similar
provisions; and NGOs engaged in transnational human rights litigation en-
courage domestic courts to take account of that body of jurisprudence.
B. The Resistance to Judicial Borrowing in US Courts
In contrast to courts in many other countries, US courts rarely cite
international or foreign authorities when they engage in constitutional con-
struction. The dearth of such citations in modern constitutional jurispru-
dence can be explained partly by the age of the United States Constitution.
US courts have less need to rely on international and foreign law because
they have developed a substantial body of jurisprudence in the 230 years of
US constitutional history. In a previous article, I demonstrated that the Su-
preme Court applied international law in more than 40 percent of public law
cases between 1801 and 1864, but it applied international law in fewer than
5 percent of public law cases in the twentieth century.67 One possible expla-
nation for decreasing reliance on international law is that US courts had less
need to consult foreign and international sources after they developed a
substantial body of domestic jurisprudence.
Although this explanation is reasonable, I believe it is incomplete. As
illustrated by the Makoni case in Zimbabwe, courts in other countries fre-
64. ZIMBABWE [CONSTITUTION] 2013 (rev. 2017), sec. 46, https://www.constituteproject.org/
search?lang=en.
65. SOUTH AFRICA [CONSTITUTION] 1996 (rev. 2012), art. 39, https://www.consti
tuteproject.org/search?lang=en.
66. See Nihal Jayawickrama, India, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCE-
MENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009).
67. See David Sloss, Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of Nine-
teenth Century Public Law Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757, 1785–89, app. tbl.2 (2014).
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quently cite international and foreign authorities when they construe provi-
sions of their national constitutions that are substantially similar to
provisions in international human rights instruments. The United States
Constitution also includes provisions that are substantially similar to provi-
sions in international human rights instruments. The Eighth Amendment
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments”68 is like Article 5 of the
UDHR, which prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.”69 The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, which guar-
antees “equal protection of the laws,”70 is similar to Article 7 of the UDHR,
which states: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law.”71 One could list numerous
other examples.
Despite the similarity between US constitutional text and the texts of
various international human rights instruments, US constitutional culture
developed a “human rights taboo” in the early 1950s. That taboo prevented
the federal political branches from ratifying international human rights trea-
ties for several decades after the United Nations adopted the UDHR in
1948.72 It still inhibits US courts from engaging in the practice of judicial
borrowing: when they do so, they are likely to provoke strident objections
that have the effect of reinforcing the taboo.73 Despite the human rights
taboo, though, international human rights norms had a profound impact on
the development of US constitutional law in the period from 1948 to 1976.
During that time period, the United States effectively incorporated interna-
tional human rights norms into federal law through a process of silent incor-
poration.74 This section explains the historical origins of the human rights
taboo and the process of silent incorporation.
The period from 1948 to 1954 was a fertile period for international
human rights litigation in US courts. The Supreme Court decided five cases
in 1948 in which litigants invoked the human rights provisions of the UN
Charter to challenge racially discriminatory laws:75 Bob-Lo Excursion Co.
v. Michigan,76 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,77 Oyama v. Califor-
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69. U.D.H.R., supra note 58, art. 5.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
71. U.D.H.R., supra note 58, art. 7.
72. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995).
73. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text (citing dissenting opinions by Justice
Scalia in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper).
74. I have developed this argument in greater detail in previous work. See David L. Sloss,
How International Human Rights Transformed the US Constitution, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 426 (2015);
David Sloss & Wayne Sandholtz, Universal Human Rights and Constitutional Change, 27 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1183 (2019).
75. For detailed analysis of these cases, see DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY
SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 187–98 (2016).
76. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People of State of Mich., 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST304.txt unknown Seq: 12 17-NOV-21 13:11
636 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:3
nia,78 Shelley v. Kraemer,79 and Hurd v. Hodge.80 The Court decided three
more cases in 1950 in which litigants raised arguments based upon the
human rights provisions of the UN Charter:81 Henderson v. United States,82
Sweatt v. Painter,83 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.84 Finally, in
1954, the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education85 and Bolling v.
Sharpe,86 both of which involved claims based on the UN Charter’s human
rights provisions.87 The Court rarely cited the UN Charter in its published
decisions, preferring instead to base its decisions on the Equal Protection
Clause.88 However, the Court ruled in favor of human rights claimants in all
ten cases.
During this period, international human rights law was developing a
very strong antidiscrimination norm, as manifested in Articles 55 and 56 of
the UN Charter,89 Article 2 of the UDHR,90 and the draft human rights
treaties that were then being negotiated. That antidiscrimination norm had
been a part of the “paper Constitution” in the United States since adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in 1868. Before the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,91
though, laws codifying racial segregation and other racially discriminatory
practices were routinely upheld as constitutionally valid. Therefore, the
Equal Protection Clause had very little practical impact on US constitu-
tional law before the United Nations adopted the UDHR in 1948. It was not
until the Fourteenth Amendment was subjected to the pressure of human
rights litigation in the years after World War II that the antidiscrimination
norm was incorporated into the “living Constitution” in a meaningful way.
In the ten cases cited in the preceding paragraph—where litigants raised
77. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
78. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
79. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
80. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
81. For detailed analysis, see SLOSS, supra note 75, at 225–29.
82. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
83. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
84. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
85. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
87. For detailed analysis of the human rights arguments in Brown and Bolling, see SLOSS,
supra note 75, at 240–48.
88. The Court’s most detailed discussion of the U.N. Charter’s human rights provisions is in
the concurring opinions of Justices Black and Murphy in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948). See id. at 649–50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 672–73 (Murphy, J., concurring).
89. See U.N. Charter art. 55 (promising “universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”);
U.N. Charter art. 56 (obligating U.N. member states “to take joint and separate action” to achieve
the goals set forth in article 55).
90. See U.D.H.R., supra note 58, art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”).
91. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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arguments based on the UN Charter’s human rights provisions—the Su-
preme Court effectively incorporated the strong antidiscrimination norm
from international human rights law into the living Constitution through a
process of silent incorporation.92
Meanwhile, the combination of domestic human rights litigation in US
courts and the contemporaneous negotiation of human rights treaties in in-
ternational fora sparked a strong political backlash in the United States,
leading to various proposals to amend the US Constitution.93 Between 1950
and 1954, the American Bar Association, Senator John Bricker, several
other senators, and the Eisenhower administration introduced different vari-
ants of a proposed constitutional amendment that came to be known as the
“Bricker Amendment.”94 The politics of the Bricker Amendment were
complicated, but Bricker’s supporters generally sought to prevent interna-
tional human rights treaties from having any impact on US domestic law. In
part, they feared that ratification of human rights treaties would become a
vehicle for altering the division of power between the states and the federal
government in the United States.
Bricker’s supporters also feared that US courts would apply interna-
tional human rights law to invalidate state laws that had been upheld as
constitutionally valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, in the no-
torious Fujii case,95 a California appellate court held that a state law that
discriminated against Japanese Americans violated the human rights provi-
sions of the UN Charter, even though it did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.96 From the perspective of Senator
Bricker and his supporters, the Fujii decision was simply intolerable be-
cause it implied that international human rights law provided stronger pro-
tection against discrimination than did the Equal Protection Clause. In fact,
when Fujii was decided in 1950, human rights law did provide stronger
protection than the Equal Protection Clause because that clause was still
being construed to validate Jim Crow laws in the South. Regardless, Fujii
was impossible to reconcile with the belief—widely shared by many Amer-
icans—that the US Constitution provides stronger protection for fundamen-
tal human rights than any other legal document in the world. A key goal of
the Bricker Amendment was to ensure that no US court would ever again
apply international human rights law in a way that conflicted with the
widely shared faith in the inherent superiority of the US Constitution.
92. I develop this argument in greater detail in Sloss, How International Human Rights
Transformed the US Constitution, supra note 74; SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY,
supra note 75, at 187–98, 225–29, 240–48.
93. See SLOSS, supra note 75, at 198–200, 219–25, 248–56.
94. See generally DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988).
95. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
96. See SLOSS, supra note 75, at 208–18 (discussing Fujii).
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Supporters of the Bricker Amendment succeeded in some ways and
failed in other ways. The proposed amendment never secured the required
two-thirds majority in the Senate, but one version fell just one vote short of
gaining Senate approval in February 1954.97 Although the proposed amend-
ment never passed, the political forces behind the Bricker Amendment were
sufficiently powerful to create an unspoken human rights taboo. That taboo
blocked any serious attempt to persuade the United States to ratify major
international human rights treaties for the next several decades.98 The taboo
also created an atmosphere in which international human rights law became
so politically toxic that civil rights litigants chose to stop citing international
human rights documents in their briefs and, as a result, US courts rarely
cited international human rights instruments in their published opinions.
Even so, one should not confuse lack of citation for lack of influence.
Despite the dearth of citations to international human rights instruments in
legal briefs and judicial opinions, international human rights norms exerted
a profound influence over the development of US law in the period from
1948 to 1976. To appreciate this point, it is helpful to recall the Declaration
of Independence, which declared that “all [human beings] . . . are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”99 Although the Founders
of the Constitution believed in inalienable rights, they created a constitu-
tional structure in which the protection of those inalienable rights was pri-
marily the responsibility of state governments, not the federal government.
As noted previously, one of the key goals of the Bricker Amendment was to
ensure that international human rights law would not alter the division of
power between the states and the federal government. In that respect,
Bricker and his supporters failed miserably. The United States effectively
federalized human rights law between 1948 and 1976 by transferring re-
sponsibility for protection of inalienable human rights from the states to the
federal government.100
A coauthor and I did an empirical study of the allocation of power over
human rights between the states and the federal government.101 We identi-
fied 68 discrete rights that are included in the UDHR. We examined the
protection of those rights at three different points in US history: in 1930,
1948, and 1976. For each of those three points in time, we classified rights
protection into four groups: exclusive state responsibility, exclusive federal
responsibility, shared responsibility with state primacy, and shared respon-
sibility with federal primacy. Table 1 presents the results of that analysis.
97. See id. at 248–56 (discussing the Bricker Amendment).
98. See Henkin, supra note 72.
99. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
100. Professor Sandholtz and I develop this argument in greater detail in Sloss & Sandholtz,
supra note 74.
101. Id.
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Table 1: Allocation of Responsibility for Protection of
68 Human Rights
 As of 1930 As of 1948 As of 1976 
























The data in table 1 show that, as of 1948, state governments exercised
primary or exclusive regulatory authority for 71 percent of the rights under
review (48 of 68), whereas the federal government exercised primary or
exclusive regulatory authority for only 29 percent (20 of 68). By 1976, the
allocation of authority between state and federal governments had flipped.
As of 1976, the federal government exercised primary or exclusive regula-
tory authority for 74 percent of the rights under review (50 of 68), and state
governments exercised primary or exclusive regulatory authority for only
26 percent (18 of 68). We refer to the transfer of regulatory authority over
human rights from the states to the federal government as the federalization
of human rights.
The data show that the process of federalization began with the New
Deal revolution in the 1930s.102 However, the federalization process accel-
erated between 1948 and 1976. Three primary mechanisms drove the pro-
cess of federalization during this period. First, the Supreme Court
federalized ten distinct rights by “incorporating” ten different provisions in
the Bill of Rights and making them binding on the states.103 (Before these
incorporation decisions, the rights at issue were binding on the federal gov-
ernment, but not the states.)104 Second, the Court federalized nine other
rights by issuing judicial decisions that established federal constitutional
protection for unenumerated rights—i.e., rights not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution’s text.105 Third, Congress federalized nine additional
rights by enacting statutes that—at an earlier point in US constitutional his-
tory—would have been deemed unconstitutional because they exceeded the
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded the reserved powers of
102. See id. at 1211–16 (discussing the federalization of human rights between 1930 and
1947).
103. See id. at 1218–20.
104. See David Sloss, Incorporation, Federalism, and International Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS: AN AMERICAN STORY 76 (Austin Sarat ed., 2017).
105. See Sloss & Sandholtz, supra note 74, at 1220–24.
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the states.106 Finally, seven other rights were federalized through some
combination of legislative action, judicial action, and constitutional amend-
ments.107 Four decades later, in 2020, the division of power over human
rights between state and federal governments is virtually the same as it was
in 1976.108
Our analysis demonstrates that the United States federalized human
rights through a process of silent incorporation. Moreover, the global diffu-
sion of international human rights norms was an important causal factor that
contributed to the federalization of human rights in the United States. To-
day, many Americans point to the Bill of Rights as a source of national
pride. However, they ignore the fact that, for most of US history, we relied
primarily on state governments, not the federal government, to protect the
rights codified in the Bill of Rights. It was not until the period after World
War II, when the United States was subjected to the transnational influence
of international human rights norms, that the Supreme Court decided to
upend decades of settled jurisprudence regarding the division of authority
between state and federal governments by establishing federal authority
over human rights protections that had traditionally been vested in state
governments. Although the key Supreme Court decisions that federalized
human rights law in the United States rarely cited international or foreign
sources, it is difficult to explain the federalization of human rights law ex-
cept by reference to the global diffusion of international human rights
norms. In short, modern US constitutional law is, to a large extent, the prod-
uct of transnational legal forces.
CONCLUSION
The sovereigntist model of constitutional law holds that each nation’s
constitution is an expression of its unique national identity. In this essay, I
have attempted to show that the sovereigntist model is descriptively inaccu-
rate. When nations adopt new constitutions, they are heavily influenced by
transnational forces; as a result, the national constitutions of most countries
in the world bear striking similarities to each other. Moreover, when domes-
tic courts interpret their national constitutions, they frequently engage in the
practice of judicial borrowing, citing decisions by foreign and international
tribunals that have construed textually similar provisions in other national
constitutions or in international human rights documents. The resistance to
judicial borrowing in US courts is largely a byproduct of the “human rights
taboo” that developed in the United States in the 1950s in the context of
debates about the proposed Bricker Amendment. Despite that human rights
taboo, though, modern constitutional law in the United States has been
heavily influenced by transnational legal forces.
106. See id. at 1224–28.
107. See id. at 1228–32.
108. See id. at 1234–36.
